Introduction
In an increasing number of disciplines, ranging from the physical (e.g. quantum mechanics) to the social (e.g. psychology, economics) sciences, natural issues arise where standard Kolmogorov probability arguments do not suffice. A unifying structure for these approaches is created here with an easily used basis for paired comparisons (whether for probabilities, correlations or other effects), which separates well-behaved terms satisfying transitivity from those causing path dependencies, cycles and other mysteries. Information about the paired comparisons (e.g. probabilities) may be known, but what causes the behaviour may not. This creates an inverse problem of understanding what kind of modelling might support these outcomes, whether it be the structure of phase space for physical systems, social norms for groups or brain processing for individuals. The basis helps to identify what may be needed.
This basis is illustrated with a surprising 'order effects' result [1] that was motived, 1 in part, by a 1997 Gallup poll about the perceived honesty of President Clinton and Vice President Gore. The order in which the question was posed, about the honesty of first either Clinton or Gore and then about the other, affected the conclusion. Wang et al. used a quantum probability model to derive QQ (quantum question) equalities that connect differences. This QQ relationship is empirically supported with three examples. These QQ equalities ( §3e) are valuable contributions for understanding order effects. But verifying the title's claim that their results '. . . reveal the quantum nature of human judgements' requires showing that these equalities always hold and that they constitute the only explanation when they do. The first, an empirical issue, is beyond the scope of this paper. As for the second, it follows from the basis that:
(i) A measure is needed to determine when the QQ relationships hold. But rather than a 'quantum nature' explanation, it follows from the basis that the QQ relationships are equivalent to a simple transitivity condition that just determines whether the relevant variables admit cyclic effects. (ii) This basis identifies properties and unspecified variables involved in the QQ expression.
Notions needed to describe the space of binary interactions are introduced ( §2) by describing pairwise voting difficulties. Resolving these problems requires identifying what causes them, which is the theme of §2b. This material is then generalized ( §3) to handle widespread paired comparison difficulties.
Pairwise voting
The voting concerns are motivated by my fictional boast [2] :
Before your next election, tell me who you want to win. For a price, I will visit your group, talk with your colleagues, and design a fair (e.g. all candidates are considered) election method. Your candidate will win.
To illustrate, suppose a 15 member department is to select one out of five candidates for a tenure track position. Their preferences (where ' ' means 'strictly preferred to') are number ranking number ranking
These voters unanimously prefer C D E, so E cannot be their top choice. Yet, E can be 'convincingly' elected with a method endorsed by Robert's Rules of Order-an agenda. This approach shares features of a tournament where, with a specified ordering of the alternatives, the winner of the first two is compared with the next listed candidate, that winner with the next one, etc. The method's outcome is the winner of the last pair. Thus, the D, C, B, A, E agenda advances the {C, D} majority vote winner to a vote with B, that winner with A, and that winner with E to obtain the final outcome. With equation (2.1) and this agenda, C unanimously beats D to be compared with B, B beats C with a two-thirds vote (the 10 voters on the top line) to be compared with A, A beats B with a two-thirds vote (the 10 voters in the first column) to be compared with E. E is the overall winner by convincingly beating A with a two-thirds vote (the 10 voters in the second row and column). 2 All votes are unanimous or of landslide (two-thirds) proportions, which (incorrectly) identifies E as the voters' overwhelming choice. Translating this example into probabilities highlights a realistic concern (which is extended to general settings with the §3 constructs) that a collection of pairwise probabilities can seriously misrepresent the actual structure of an underlying source space. An accompanying issue is to explain why this is so; a second is to discover how to combine paired outcomes to combat such difficulties ( §2b).
Natural objectives suggested by this example include finding all possible paired comparison outcomes, and identifying all structures in the source space-the space of voter preferences-that cause such conclusions; this includes finding what causes cycles and all path dependency concerns. These goals have been answered for any number of alternatives, and even for triplets, etc. [2] [3] [4] . While any collection of paired rankings can emerge from voting [5] , it is of more interest to determine all possible tallies. Constraints on all possible three-candidate, pairwise tallies (from complete transitive preferences) are identified by Saari [2, 6] . As indicated next (e.g. theorem 2.1; generalized in theorem 3.5), answers for n ≥ 3 alternatives involve identifying the profile structures with extreme outcomes.
(a) Structure of the source space
The source space uses standard social choice assumptions: each voter has a complete (each pair can be compared) transitive ranking of all n ≥ 3 alternatives. Assign each of the n! strict (i.e. no ties) rankings to a particular R n! axis. A profile (a list of how many voters prefer each ranking) becomes a point in R n! .
To emphasize differences in tallies, let 
A basis for the (n − 1)-dimensional ST n is given in [3] . The final subspace is the orthogonal complement of the kernel and strongly transitive spaces. The importance of this Cyclic space, C n , is that it consists of all possible profiles and profile components causing cycles, path dependencies and all other complexities that can occur with majority votes.
The central construct for a C n basis is what I call a ranking wheel. As indicated in figure 1 , this rotating wheel lists ranking numbers, 1 to n, uniformly along the wheel's edge. Place the names of the n alternatives on the wall. The ranking wheel number adjacent to a name identifies its ranking position. To obtain the next ranking, rotate the wheel to place '1' by the next alternative. Continue until '1' has been by each name; this defines a set of n rankings. Illustrating with figure 1, the set is
A B C D E, B C D E A, C D E A B, D E A B C, E A B C D. (2.3)
That these terms must play a central role in developing a comprehensive theory for voting is suggested by the fact that the top row of equation (2.3) was used to create the equation (2.1) example with its cyclic behaviour. A ranking wheel array is a Z n orbit of a ranking. By construction, each candidate is in first, second, . . . , last place precisely once, so no candidate is favoured: The outcome should be a tie. But by ignoring the full symmetry structure, pairwise outcomes define a cycle. The D E ranking, for instance, appears in the first four equation ( (2.2) equality, the example has
In general, the probabilities associated with a ranking wheel defined by X 1 · · · X n significantly violate the strongly transitive constraint equation (2.2) by satisfying p(X i , X i+1 ) = ((n − 1) − 1)/n = (n − 2)/n and the equality
(2.5)
According to the decomposition, paired comparison outcomes fail the strongly transitive condition (equation (2.2) 
Equality holds iff all of a profile's (at least two) rankings come only from the ranking wheel defined by
The next step is to discover what else affects pairwise rankings. According to theorem 2.2, this is it: All pairwise behaviour is captured just by the cyclic and strictly transitive terms. (Theorem 2.1 is a consequence of theorem 2.2.)
Theorem 2.2 (Saari [2,3]).
With pairwise voting, the space of profiles R n! can be orthogonally decomposed into a kernel, where P(X i , X j ) = 0 for all i, j and all profiles, the (n − 1)-dimensional ST n , and the (n − 1)!/2-dimensional C n space spanned by ranking wheel configurations.
According to theorem 2.2, the last theorem 2.1 statement requires the profile to be the sum of the ranking wheel configuration (which gives the equation (2.6) equality) and strongly transitive terms. Transitive outcomes can satisfy equation (2.6) iff all preferences come from the specified ranking wheel. 
Differences from the equation (2.6) equality, then, are due to rankings that differ from those in the specified ranking wheel configuration (e.g. [7] ).
(b) Unavoidable problems
Surprisingly, the sole source of all majority and supermajority pairwise voting problems are the ranking wheel configurations (theorem 2.2). Thus, this structure can be used to simplify, subsume and extend the large social choice/voting theory literature that examines these complexities [7] . To illustrate with the seminal Arrow's Theorem [8] , consider the challenge of designing a voting rule for voters with complete transitive preferences over n ≥ 3 alternatives; the rule must produce a complete, transitive societal (i.e. group) ranking. A natural approach is to use the reductionist method where, to reduce the complexity, paired comparisons are emphasized; i.e. for each pair of alternatives, design a decision rule. Manifesting the gained simplicity is that the rule uses only information about how each voter ranks this particular pair. The approach seems simple, but the objective is impossible to attain: no such method exists. This is the conclusion of Arrow's result (which played a role in his 1972 Nobel Prize) and of my above generalized formulation [6, pp. 83-100, 9] . A common branding of Arrow's Theorem is that 'with three or more alternatives, no voting method is fair'. But, as the above description demonstrates, this interpretation is incorrect. Instead, Arrow's Theorem is a negative commentary about a methodology: the reductionist approach used with paired comparisons guarantees that situations exist where the outcome violates transitivity.
This difficulty is strictly caused by the ranking wheel structure. By forming the basis for the Cyclic subspace, these configurations identify natural connecting links for pairs. But paired comparisons emphasize 'parts', so rather than involving these critical linking structures, paired comparisons sever them. By doing so, they generate cycles, which now must be expected because they reflect the ranking wheel's circular construction. Indeed, a profile free from Cyclic terms (it is strongly transitive) has no links to be cut, which then allows Arrow's conditions to be satisfied by pairwise voting. Thus Arrow's Theorem and all of the problems described in [7] share the same explanation: by severing these crucial links, paired comparisons distort critical information about the true underlying structure of the source space (ranking wheel configurations); this distortion is what generates all possible pairwise difficulties. Paired comparison outcomes, then, can provide a distorted image of the source space by ignoringactually, cutting into pieces-the actual underlying structure: as developed in §3, this can happen in general.
If ranking wheel components, which should create complete ties, cause all of the difficulties, a natural resolution is to strip a profile of these terms and use what remains: this is equivalent to projecting the profile to the strongly transitive subspace. An easier way to accomplish this objective is with the following: 
If profile p ∈ C n , then B(X j ) = 0 for all j. Thus the B(X i ) rankings depend only on the strongly transitive portion of a profile. If p ∈ ST n , the majority vote rankings are complete, transitive and agree with the ranking of B(X j ) values.
This B(X i ) approach is equivalent to the Borda Count [2] , which tallies ballots by assigning n − j points to the jth positioned candidate. To indicate why equation (2.7) serves as a projection, notice from equation (2.3) that
which sum to zero. As this relationship holds for all candidates and any n, the B(X i ) tally drops a profile's Cyclic components and retains information only about the strongly transitive terms.
Space of paired outcomes
To address most ways to make paired comparisons [10] , use d i,j ∈ (−∞, ∞) to compare the {X i , X j } pair. Similar to the P(X i , X j ) function, let
All of the n(n − 1) d i,j values are determined by the ( n 2 ) {d i,j } i<j terms (equation (3.1)), so vector (i) The strongly transitive space ST n What assumes the role of equation (2.2) is the strongly transitive requirement
As with equation (2.2), this expression resembles sums of signed distances where the distance from i to j plus that from j to k equals the signed distance from i to k. In this way, it represents a strong version of transitivity. Equation (3.3) restricts d n to an (n − 1)-dimensional 3 strongly transitive plane: A direct computation proves that vectors in this space satisfy equation (3.1). Illustrating with
Theorem 3.2 [10]. A basis for ST n is given by {B
j=1 is a basis for ST n , applications emphasize appropriate ST n subsets.
(b) CY n ; the ST n normal space
The ST n plane of strongly transitive entries and its normal space (denoted by CY n for 'cyclic') define an R ( n 2 ) coordinate system. The importance of CY n is that (similar to C n in voting) its terms cause all paired comparison peculiarities. A basis for this cyclic space CY n resembles the ranking wheel construction of figure 1.
As indicated in figure 2 , list, in any order, the n indices along the edge of a circle. Moving clockwise about the circle, each integer is preceded by an integer and followed by a different one. In figure 1a , for instance, 1 precedes 6 and follows 3. 2,3,4) . So, nothing other than strongly transitive and cyclic components (which have very different properties) need be considered. An illustration of the value theorem 3.4 adds is that if a given d n exhibits unexpected features, then d n 's cyclic component must be the cause! Thus, for instance, developing conclusions similar to Arrow's result ( §2b) now are easy and immediate [9] . Also, theorem 3.4 identifies source space properties needed to generate certain behaviours; i.e. the properties must be able to create appropriately required CY n terms.
(c) Properties
As with P(X i , X j ), non-transitive outcomes require C n π terms. Extreme settings are defined by these components. For instance, equation (2.5) defined the maximum sum of marginal differences, which come from a ranking wheel configuration. With C n π defined by the listing π = (1, 2, . . . , n) , we have the following: 5) upper bound of β = (n − 2)/n, of one less than unanimity, leads to the ranking wheel construction establishing that the source space structure allows transitive inputs (preferences) to cause cyclic outcomes. In this manner, theorem 3.5 extends theorem 2.1 to all settings, and offers insights into the structure of source space.
Assuming the B(X j ) role (equation (2.7)) is the Borda assignment rule (BAR) defined as 3.7) ) eliminates cyclic components. Indeed, theb j value of any C n π is zero because C n π has only two non-zero d j,k terms where one is positive and the other negative, so they cancel in theb j summation. Thus,b j serves as a projection of d from R ( n 2 ) to its strongly transitive ST n space. The way in which theb j functions handle strongly transitive terms is specified in the following. Theorem 3.6 [10] . For any n ≥ 3 (where a n = 0),
Thus, the BAR ranking for d n reflects the ordering of the coefficients in its strongly transitive component; cyclic terms are ignored. If a i > a j , then, independent of any cyclic terms, it must be thatb i >b j .
(d) An interesting phenomenon
It is reasonable to expect that dropping an alternative has a minimal effect on a ranking. For instance, with a X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 ranking, if alternative X 4 is dropped, the X 1 X 2 X 3 outcome would be anticipated. But this need not be the case! The sole source of this effect is the cyclic components. As equation (3.10) illustrates, dropping alternatives from cyclic terms creates cyclic terms plus strongly transitive terms. (The ST 3 term in equation (3.10) defines the X 1 X 2 X 3 ranking.) These unexpected ST n components can cause a rule's ranking (definitely its weights) to differ. The BAR ranking for 3B 4 1 + 2B 4 2 + B 4 3 − 9C
4
(1,2,3,4) is X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 , for instance, but by dropping X 4 (see equation (3.10) ) it becomes the reverse, X 3 X 2 X 1 . What adds concern to this feature is that all major decision rules involve ST n data components, so all of these rules are affected by this theorem 3.7 feature whereby dropping alternatives can scramble the resulting ranking. This difficulty, strictly caused by the CY n terms, can be expected to affect all major paired comparison rules. But BAR retains some level of regularity because (theorem 3.8) the averaged outcome over all ways to drop an alternative remains consistent. The dimension of CY n exceeds
